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Discussions involving the system of generalized currency floating as
this relates to the less developed countries (LDC's) have two aspectsl
namely: (1) the effects on LDC economies of the adoption of more flexlble
exchange rates by industrialized countries; and (2) the implications of
exchange rate flexibility in LDCts themselves. I This paper deals primarily
with the second issue, it attempts to evaluate, no doubt in a limited
manners the exchange experience of the Philipplnes during the period of
generalized floating of major currencies.
Section i provides a brief historical perspective on the 1970 exchange
rate reform. Section 2 describes and analyzes the post-1970 exchange rate
system, highlighting some of the country's structural characteristics
which can help explain its choice of ezchange rate regime. Changes in the
nominal peso-dollar exchange rate are examined, and speculative pressures
during the period of greater exchange rate flexibility are compared to those
during the earlier period of adjustable par values. Section 3 introduces
the framework for analyzing exchange rate changes in a world of floating
rates_ Quarterly nominal and real effective exchange rates are calculated
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and discussed, and the contribution of exogeneous currency realingments on
effective exchange rate movements is assessed. Furthermore, the variability
of monthly effective exchange rates during 1973-1981 is compared to that in
1964-1972. Section 4 studies exchange rate changes in the light of official
intervention .behavior in the foreign exchange market. Alternative hypotheses
about such behavior are formulated and tested. Finally, the major findings
of the study are summarized in Section 5.
The Philippines adopted a flexible exchange rate system in early 1970
and has kept it in place since then. In many respects, this system has
assisted the country in weathering the external shocks which began with the
o£i crisis in 1973-74 without the exchange upheavals reminiscent of the
1950's and 1960's. While external balance is yet to be achieved, the post-
1970 exchange rate regime, which is more precisely characterized by limited
rather than full flexibility, has probably prevented more fundamental dis-
equilibrium from developing, making abrupt and disruptive exchange rate
adjustments less of a possibility. The analysis of official intervention
behavior in the Philippine foreign exchange market demonstrates the importance
of the current account in the exchange rate adjustments undertaken by the
monetary authorities, as well as the latter's commitment to the peso~U.S.
dollar exchange rate. However, the rate of response to current account
developments is found to be rather weak. Furthermore, because major currencies
are floating, pre-occupation with the nominal exchange rate has resulted in
effective exchange rate changes which are not in the direction suggested by
the underlying balance of payments developments in many instances.
1. The 1970 _.chanae Rate Reform
The Philippines already had a flexible exchange rate systmn even before
the onset of generalized currency floatlns in early 1973. Confronted by a
foreign exchange crisis that developed in the late 1960's, the goversment
allowed the Philippine peso to float in the foreign exchange market on
February 21, 1970.
It is not clear, however, whether the monetary authoritiesv longer term
objective was, in fact.to shift to a flexible exchange rate reg.. In 3anuary
1962, for example, the peso was allowed to float, only to be fixed six months
tater. 2 Similarly. in the 1970 floating episode, the exchange rate appears
to have been stabilized by October of that year. Zt seems, therefore, that
the principal motivation for floating at the time of its adoption was to
determine what the new peso-dollar exchange rate should be rather than to
move to a flexible exchange rate system. Eventually, the exchange rate _uld
have been fixed, as in the 1960's, were it not for the events that subsequently
characterized the international monetary scene.
These events may have provided a "disguised blessing" as far as the
Philippines is concerned, in the sense that exchange rate flexibility probably
enabled the country to avoid the exchange upheavals that occurred in the 1950's
and mate 1960's. Based on the Philippines _ exchange rate history, an exchange
crisis of the proportion ei_lar to that of the 1950's and 1960_s could have
easily developed in the 1970's, considering the rapid _creases in oil prices,
the sharp and extended deterioration in the terms of trade following these
price increases, 3 and recession in the industrialized countries. It will not
4be too difficult to see what the _ituation would have been if the government
were committed to a fixed _eha'_g._fete.
The country's exchange c._:perience d_:ring_i_epost-independence period
up to 1970 is well documented in Baldwin (1975). Essentially, what one can
observe is a cycle consisting of a period of g_o,_i_%_cernal imbalances,
followed by the imposition of various forms of tr_d_ and exchange controls,
and finally, a delayed and, therefore, large deva!u_:tic_ when authorities
could no longer defend the existing exchang_ rate. Obviously, the adjustment
process that such a devaluation required was costly and painful. Had changes
in the exc range ra_e been undertaken more promptly, before relative price
distortions could grow and become embedded in the economic system, adjustments
would have b__enfar less disruptive. But the problem was precisely the
difficulty of making timely e_change rate adjustments under the par value
system even when such changes were clearly called for. Accordingly, the
past two devaluation eplsode_,too_:place under a "c_i_is atmosphere"
(Krueger 1975, p. 50) and had b_2e_traumatic experiences, both politically
and economically.
Under the fi_ed exchange rate residue,__her,_w_m a great tendency to
consider the exchzage rate as an objective rather than as an instrument of
policy. Haintaining the existing exchange rate was a matter of national
pride and prestige, and changes in the rate, or even prospects of such
changes, were critical political issues. These attitudes have perhaps
persisted under the more recent system of exchange rate flexibility, but
to a lesser extent, Because exchange rates are "floating," the public have
increasingly considered changes in the exchange rate as a normal economic
5phenomenon. And because these changes have been made gradually , adjustments
have had less disruptive consequences. Furthermore, policymakers have
probably become more confident of the use of the exchange rate as an instru-
ment of development policy; reliance on trade restrictions has been less
in the 1970's despite substantial trade and current account deficits after
4
1973,
These do not imply, however, that the mere adoption of flexible exchange
rates in th_ Philippines has solved for it all p_oblems of adjustment. All
that is indicated is that exchange flexibility "can cope with much more
serious tensions and disturbances than the previous system of fixed exhhanges"
(Haberler 1974, p, 331). Whether or not a flexible exchange rate regime is
able to provide a means by which a viable exchange rate can be maintained
still depends on the actual conduct Of exchange rate policy. Accordingly,
the remainder of tb/s paper looks into how exchange rate policy has been
pursued in the country since 1970 with emphasis on the period of generalized
currency floating, 1973-1981.
2. The Post-1970 Exchange Rate Regime
The Philippine peso has been traditionally tied to the U,S. dollar, and
it has continued to be so up to the present time. Since the exchange rate
reform of 1970, the spot-peso-dollar exchange rate has been determined
daily on the basis of Interbank trading in the foreign exchange market. 5
Until April 1972, the daily interbank spot peso-dollar exchange rate, or
the "guiding rate," was based on the buying and selling ratee of the last
transaction in the foreign exchange market, Thereafter, the rate has been
established on the basis of the weighted average of exchange rates for all
sales made in the preceding day, the weights being the value of trading
at each exchange rate. Exchange rates for other currencies are based on
the spot buying and selling rates in New York of these currencies (in terms
of U.S. dollars) at the close of the day prior to the actual purchase in
Manila and on the Central Bank's current buying and selling rates for U.S.
dollars. There is no domestic forward exchange market, but forward cover
is made available by the Central Bank for transactions involving swap •
arrangements.
While it is officially maintained that "all exchange transactions take
place in a free market, ''6 the Central Bank has exercised direct control over
movements in the peso-dollar exchange rate through the purchase or sale of
foreign exchange: "Generally, the Central Bank (or an agent bank acting
in its behalf) stood ready to provide foreign exchange at the current rate
to maintain the stability of the exchange rate" (Central Bank Annual Report
1970, p. 70). In 1970 and 1971, the Central Bank limited its intervention
activities in the foreign exchange market, making sales of only U.5.$5
million and U.S.$23.5 million, respectively. Beginning in 1972, however,
Central Bank intervention increased substantially, its sales and purchases
of foreign exchange accounting for a markedly increased proportion of the
total volume of fore_ign exchange transactions undertaken by commercial banks,
In 1970, this proportion was only 9.4 per cent; by 1972, th_s had risen to
about 60 per cent° 7 Another instrument which has been used by the Central
Bank to manage the exchange rate is the maintenance of bands or margins
around the guiding rate within which the peso-dollar rate is allowed to
float. Until April 1972, the margins were 3/4 of one per cent above and
one per cent below the guiding rate. Subsequently, the exchange rate was
allowed to float within a wider band of 4-1/2 per cent on each side of
the guiding rate for the trading day.
Aside from these forms of control over the exchange rate, there are
a number of trade and exchange restrictions which are still in operation,
although as mentioned above, there has been less reliance on the former
in the 1970's as compared to the preceding two decades. The regulations
involving invisible payments and the capital account are still quite
stringent. For instance, while remittances of profits and dividends are
generally free of restrictions, there are quantitative l_m_tations on
invisible payments such as those for travel abroad, educational expenses
of students abroad and maintenance of dependents abroad. Residents are not
allowed to purchase foreign securities nor maintain bank balances overseas.
However, they can maintain foreign currency bank deposits domestically,
provided the source of the deposit is eligible for deposlt. 8 All foreign
borrowings require prior Central Bank approval.
It should be clear by now that the exchange rate system In the Ph£1ip-
pines is one of limited rather than full flexibility, so that the regime
may be more precisely described as a "crawling peg" (Willlazson 1965, p. 2)
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rather than floating. Thls exchange arrangement _s not unexpected in a
developing country llke the Philippines where certain structural charac-
teristics preclude free floating asa feasible alternative. Table i
presents a selected set of indicators of the Philippine economy which can
help explain the country*s choice of exchange rate regime, among other
things.
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Table 1
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS
I. Grp_s Domestic Product (GDP)j Population and Inflation Rate
.... ^ °_,.
A, GDP (ln million U.S. dollars, 1980)_ / 31,337
B. Populatlon (in thousand persons, mld-1980) 48,317
C. GDP Per Capita (in U.S. dollars, 1980) 649
1960-70 1970-80
D. Growth Rate of Real GDP (_ per year) 4_8 5,9
E. Inflation Rate (Z)
Consumer Price Index 5.3 13.8
Wholesale Price Index 5.7 17,1
GDP Deflator 5.7 13.3
If. Trade and Exchange Market Related Indlcators
1965 1970 1975 1980
A. Proportion of Trade in Goods
and Services in GDP (_) 34,4 38.4 43,9 46.2
B. Share of Tradltlonal Ex_orts
in Total Exports (_)_7 79.5 78.3 63.3 43.9
C. Share of Top Two Tradlng
Partners in Total Trade (Z)
a. United States 39.8 35.0 26.8 25.3
b. Japan 25.9 35.0 31.2 22.6
C. U.S. and Japan 65.7 70.0 56.0 47.9
D. Imports According to End Use (Z)
a. Capltal Goods _c/ 18.7 18.8 19.5 16.2
b. Intermediete Goods _d/ 62.8 74.3 72.6 79,4
c. Consumer Goods 18.5 6.9 7.9 4.4
E. Ratio Of Commerclal Bank to
Central Bank Holdlngs of
Foreign Exchanse Assets (Z) 48.7 51.0 52.8 60.0
Sources: Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical Bulletin; National
Economic and Development Authority, Philippine Statistical
Yearbook; IMP, P1nanclal Statistics.
a_/ Based on the GDP at 1980 pesos and the average 1980 exchange rate.
_/ Coconut oil, copra, copra meal or cake, dessicated coconut, logs
and lumber, sugar and copper concentrates,
c_/ Machinery and equipment.
_/ Unprocessed and semi-processed raw materials, and supplies.
9It can readily be seen why the Pb_llppines opted to continue to be in
the U.S. dollar currency area during the period of generalized floating
among major currencies. Aside from the fact that the peso has been histo-
rically tied to the U.S. dollar_ the U.S. has remained the Philippines _
principal trading partner, although Japan has posed a serious threat to
the U.S. in the latter regard. That free floating is not a feasible alter-
native for the Philippines can be explained by the relative openness of the
economy and by the absence of an internationally integrated financial market
(Crockett and Nsouli 1977; Branson and Katseli 1978). The relatively open
character of the Philippine economy (the proportion of trade in goods and
services in GDP was 46.2 per cent in 1980) does not make floating feasible
because domestic residents would tend to want contracts to be effectively
denominated in foreiEn currency, and there would be little basis for dp-_nd
for domestic currency. On the other hand, because the domestic capital
market is not integrated internationally, the supply of and demand for
foreign exchange would be determined mainly by current account flows, and
short-run stability depends on the Marshall-Lerner conditions concerning
trade elasticities. If these conditions do not hold in the short-run, e.g.,
in view of lags in responses and relatively inflexible prices, then floating
would be unstable. This would result in a considerable increase in uncer-
tainty, wh/chwould, in turn, adverselyaffect trade and investment flows.
Changes in No_nal Exchange Rates
From January 1970 to the eud of the decade, the peso-dollar exchange
rata increased by 93.6 per cent from _3.92 per U.S. dollar to 27.59 per
I0
U.S. dollar. The largest increase during this period occurred in 1970
when the rate rose from _3.92 per U.S, dollar to _6.43 per U.S, dollar,
representing a 64.0 per cent increase. In comparison, the exchange rate
in the 1960's depreciated by 95.0 per cent from 22.00 per U.S. dollar to
_3.90 per O. S, dollar.
Since March 1973_ when the system of generalized currency floating
was initiated, the peso-dollar rate has risen by 20.1 per cent from _6.77
per U.S. dollar in March 1973 to 28.13 per U.S. dollar in December 1981.
This is a considerably smaller magnitude of depreciation as compared to
those resulting from the 1960 and 1970 devaluations. Moreover, adjustments
have been made continuously in small increments (Figure 1). The average
absolute monthly percentage change in any year since 1973 has been less
than one per cent, the largest being 3/4 of one per cent. On an annual
basis, the average absolute percentage change is 2.2 per cent per year.
In this connecticut, it is significant to observe the prevailing interest
rate differentials during this period. As Table 2 shows, the differentials
have been generally kept well over the average rate of crawl of the exchange
rate, although there were a few exceptions, e.g. j the rate differentials
with the U.K. in 1974 and 1977-1979, and with the U.S. in 1979.
Based on the predominant trend of nominal exchange rates, the exchange
experience of the Philippines during the period of generalized currency
floating can be dlvided into four sub-periods. The first is during March
1973 tO the third quarter of 1974 when rates were slightly appreciating.
The second covers the period from the last quarter of 1974 to the third
quarter of 1975 when depreciation was the dominant trend. The third period,
from the last quarter of 1975 to 1979, is characterized by a slight appre,
Figure 1
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Table 2
INTEREST RATES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND SELECTED COUNTRIES: 1973-1981
(End of Period Per Cent Per Annum Rates)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Phlllpplnes _a/ 9.74 10.03 16.90 15.42 12.00 11.52 12.70 14.85 16.91
HongKon_ -b/ 8.00 6.00 3.25 1.75 9.25 4.50 9.25 13.00 14.00
Singapore _c/ n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.76 4.54 5.29 7.15 11.22 12.05
United States_d/ 7_41 7.11 5.21 4.41 6.14 9.34 12.10 13.60 12.97
Japa_ / 5.80 6.83 5.68 4.15 6.06 4.86 8.13 9.90 6.75
Germany _-f/ 7.00 5.63 3.i5 2.65 3.96 4.06 9.58 10.27 10.82
Unlted Kingdom _/ 8.31 12.42 10.99 10.64 13.51 11.56 15.84 13.02 14.78
Switzerland _/ 5.50 6.00 1.50 1.12 1.12 0.13 4.42 5.75 8.75
Sources: Philippines - Philippine Financial Statlstlcs_ _onEKong - }!on_Kong _[onthly Digest of
Statistles; Singapore - The Monetary Authorltv of Sin_agore StRtlstlcal Bulletin;
All Others - O.E.C.D. Maln Economic Indlcators.
_/ 1973-1974: 91-day Treasury Bills' rate; 1975-1981: 61-90-da y money market rates.
b_/ Three-month time deposit rates.
_/ Three-month deposit rates.
d__] 90-day Treasuy Bills' rates.
e__] 1973-1976: 60-day Treasury Bills' rates; 1977-1981: "Gensaki" or money market rates.
f_.]Three-month loan rates.
_/ 91-day Treasury Bills' rate.
h/ Three-month deposit rates.
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ciation and relative stability of the exchange rate. The last period
consists of the more recent years from 1980 to 1981, when the rates
started to depreciate once again. It would be useful to note the country's
price experience during these periods. The annual rate of domestic inflation,
as measured by the consumer price index, was 25 per cen¢ during the first
period, 8.1 per cent during the second period, I0.1 per cent during the
third period, and 14.8 per ceut during the last period.
The most notable feature of the exchange Fate changes decribed above
is the rather limited extent of nominal depreciation from 1973 to 1981.
Considering the magnitude of the country's trade and current account
deficits since 1974 (Table 3), as well as the relatively rapid rate of
I0
domestic inflation (Figure 2), one would have expected to see a flexible
exchange rate resulting in a larger depreciation of the domestic currency
vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. In general, a country confronted by current
account deficits can make the necessary adjustments by financing the deficits
through borrowings from abroad or drawing down on reserves, by allowing the
exchange rate to depreciate, or by depressing incomes or lowering prices.
These options are of course not mutually exclusive. In the case of the
Philippines, it appears that the decision taken by the monetary authorities
was to _nimlze the change in the nominal exchange rate principally through
external financing.
From 1973 to 1981, net long-term capital inflows averaged U.s.$g06
million per year. In contrast, the combined net long-term capital inflows
during the _m-u-diately preceding ten years amounted to only U°S.$752 million.
The country's external long-term and medium-term debt outstanding increased
Table 3
S__ BAIANCEOF PA_NTS EE__%'fS, 1973-1981
(In Million U.S. Dollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Exports, f.o.b. I,886 2,725 2,294 2,574 3,151 3,425 4,601 5,788 5,722
Imports,f.o.b. I,596 3,143 3,459 3,634 3,915 4,732 6,142 7,727 7,946
Trade IBalance 290 -418 -i,165 -i,060 - 764 -1,307 -i,541 -i,939 -2,224
Sarvlces (Net) - -34 - 45 - 259 -248 - 178 - 390 - 546 - 541
Transfers (Net) 246 276 318 269 260 312 355 434 472
CurrentAccount
Balance 536 - 176 - 892 -I,050 - 752 -I,173 -i,576 -2,051 -2,293
OfficialGrants and
Imng-TermCapital (Net) 135 172 482 i,184 878 i,062 i,250 I,077 i,739
Basic Balance 671 - 4 - 410 134 126 - iii - 326 - 974 - 554
Source: CantralBank of the Philippines,Armual Reports.•
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by almost six times from U.S.$2.0 billion in December 1973 to U.S.$II.4
billion in December 1981; and at least up to 1980, the magnitude of
external financing enabled the Philippine monetary authorities not only
to maintain the level of the country's international reserves but also
to raise it (Table 4). In 1973, international reserves of the Central
Bank stood at U.S.$1.0 billion. By 1980, Central Bank reserves have reached
U.S.$3.2 billion. In terms of monthly merchandise imports which a parti-
cular level of reserves can finance, the Central Bank has maintained a
reserve level which has not fallen below an average equivalent of 4.3 month's
imports since 1973. The corresponding figure in the 1960's and the first
two years of the 1970ts was 2.5 months of imports. In 1981, the current
account deficit reached a peak of U.S.$2.3 billion and could not be fully
financed by net capital inflows amounting to only U.S.$1.Z bill_on. The
Central Bank obviously decided to draw down on its reserves rather than
allow a drastic depreciation of the currency.
Based on an interview with senior government officials, Bautista (1978,
p. 4) explains the policy of shoring up foreign exchange reserves as follows:
"The unexpectedly large current account deficit in 1974 and the perceived
instability in the world economy tscared_ the monetary authorities into
exerting efforts to borrow from the international capital market and build
up the Central Bank reserves. In the succeeding two years of increasin&ly
worsening current account balance, the strategy apparently adopted was to
maintain the high reserve level as a safeguard against speculative activities
in the foreign exchange market. It is also claimed that the cost of holding
these resmrves has not been substantial, since their yields from short-term
placements and time deposits have been relatively high (averaging 6-7%)."
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Table 4
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, 1970-1981
(In Million U.S. Dollars)
Official , Months of Imports
Year Reserve s_a/_ Coverage
1970 251 2.8
1971 376 3.8
1972 549 5.3
1973 1,037 7.8
1974 1,503 5.7
1975 1,361 4.7
1976 It642 5.4
1977 1,525 4.7
1978 1,883 4.8
1979 2,423 4.7
1980 3,155 4.9
1981 2,574 3.7
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines
_/Including gold and SDR's.
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While the level of international reserves in the Philippines may he
relatively high in a historical sense, it is not necessarily so by inter-
national standards. Table 5 shows that in 1979_ the level of Philippine
international reserves in terms of months of import coverage was only
slightly higher than the average for low income countries (countries with
per capita GNP of up to U.S.$380 based on World Bank classification). On
the other hand, the comparable figures for middle income countries (countries
with per capita GNP of over U.S.$380) and industrialized countries were
slightly more than that in the Philippines. The median reserve level in
months of import coverage for all middle-income countries included in the
1981 World Bank World Development Report is 4.5 months_ very close to the
estimate for the Philippines of 4.7 months.
The Black Market for Foreign Exchange and Speculative Pressures
Has disruptive speculation become less of a problem during the more
recent period Of limited exchange rate flexibility? During the earlier
period of adjustable par values, anticipated large devaluations presented
considerable opportunities for obtaining substantial payoffs from speculation.
Since exchange rate adjustments have been made frequently in relatively
small doses after 1970_ there is a great likelihood that incentives for
speculation may have been somewhat reduced. Haberler (1972, p. 3),
referring to the Brazilian experience, suggests that even in the case where
the currency is expected to go down and never move up in the foreseeable
future, "... speculation ceases to be a serious problem if exchange rate
changes are small enough and frequent enough. ''II In order to ascertain
19
Table 5
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES OF SELECTED COUP"tRIES
AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES s 1979
(In months of import coverage)
A. Groups of Countries (Averages)
i. Low-lncome countries 4.2
2. Middle-income countries 5.2
3. Industrial countries 5.0
B, Selected Countries
1. South Korea 1.5
2. Mexico 1.7
3° Pakistan 2.5
4, Indonesia 3.4
5. Srl Lanka 4.1
6. Singapore 4.1
7. Brazil 4.1
8. Thailand 4.2
9. Bolivia 4,5
10. Philippines 4.6
ii. Burma 4.8
12, Malaysla 5.6
13. Chile 5.7
14. Paraguay 8,8
15. India 10.2
16, Colo_bla 12.7
17. Argentina 13.4
Source: World Bank, Wor!d Develo_eut Report. 1981.
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whether this has indeed been the case for the Philippines, the ratios of
black market rates over official or guiding rates in the 1950's and 1960's
are compared with those in the 1970's. Inasmuch as the Philippine black
market for foreign exchange is a highly speculative one, such a comparison
may at least provide a rough idea of the relative extentof speculative
activity during the period of fixed and flexible exchange rates.
As Table 6 shows, the exchange rate was subjected to tremendous
speculative pressures in the 1950's. The smallest margin of black market
rates over official rates was 24 per cent at the beginning of the decade.
Thereafter, the margins exhibited an upward trend, so that by 1959, the
black market rate was double the official exchange rate. It was during this
12
period when various trade and exchange controls were introduced and expanded.
With the initiation of liberalization measures in 1960, the margins were
reduced to about 30 per cent in 1960 and 20 per cent in 1961. The margins
further contracted in 1962 when exchange decontrol was implemented. In the
following years of decontrol until the first half of 1967, the black market
13
rate for foreign exchange stayed close to the official exchange rate.
However, when the trade balance worsened from a deficit of 0.$.$25 million in
1966 to a deficit of U.S.$242 million in 1967, the black market became bullish
again; the prem/ummoved from 16 per cent during the last quarter of 1968 to
43 per cent in the same quarter the following year. In January 1970, one
month before the peso was allowed to float, the margin stood at almost 60
per cent.
The 1970 exchange reform appears to have relieved the pressure on the
exchange rate, and for the rest of the 1970's, the margins would remain within
5-10 per cent except in the last quarter of 1975, when the margin hit 14 per
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cent. The relatively stable and lower margins during this more recent
14
exchange rate history are worth noting. Considering the country's
substantial trade and current account deficits since 1974 and the relatively
high rates of domestic inflation, a rapid climb in the margins of black
market over guiding rates could have easily taken place. That they did
not do so suggests that the system of gradual and continuously changing
exchange rates, while not eliminating disruptive speculation totally, has
dampened it to a good extent.
3. Generalized Floating of Major Currencies
and Effective Exchange Rates
So far, the discussion has focused only on the nominal peso-dollar
exchange rate. No account has yet been taken of the fact that since the
early seventies, major currencies have been floating. Under such circums-
tances, pegging to any one of them implies floating vis-a-vis the currencies
of other trading partners. It is therefore necessary to have a measure of
the value of the domestic currency in relation to a representative set of
currencies rather than merely to that of the intervention currency. Such
a measure is the "effective exchange rate" (EER), which is defined as a
15
weighted average of the exchange rates of the Philippines' trading partners.
An EER index measures the proportional change in the Philippine peso vis-
a-vis the currencies of the country's trading partners relative to a
selected base period (Rhomberg 1976). Different EER indices can be computed,
depending on, among sther%the base period selected, the partner countries
included, the weighing scheme employed and the type of averaging formula
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used. The factors of greatest consequence are, however, which partner
countries to include in the index and what weighing scheme to use. The
former is dictated by the geographical pattern of trade, while the appro-
priate choice of weights depends on the particular objectives of analysis
or policy (Branson and Katseli 1978, 1980). If r_ denotes units of domestic
currency per unit of the currency of trading partner i, and wi represents
the weight for trading partner i, then the effective exchange rate index E
is given by
E = _ ' (1)
i wiri
where a dot over a variable indicates a proportional change in that variable,
_w. - 1, and i = 1,...,n trading partners.
Let r ffi uuits of home currency per unit of numeraire currency (in the
O
Philippine case, pesos per U.$. dollar), and r i ffi units of currency i per
unit of numeraire, e.g., yen per U.S. dollar, DH per U.S. dollar, etc. The
exchange rate r i is obtained from the ratio of r o to r i ; hence
"* (2)
Substituting (2) in (1) and recalling that Z wi - I yields
1
'* (3)Effi_ - rw.r..
o i I_
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It can be readily seen from (3) that even if the peso-dollar rate r o
were to remain fixed, the effective exchange rate could change whenever
the dollar's relationship with the currency of a third country changes.
More important, these changes may not reflect the balance of payments
adjustment needs of the country and may undermine rather than enhance the
pursuit of domestic policy objectives. For example, the country may find
its effective exchange rate appreciating when the current account is
weakening and vice versa.
In principle, it would be possible to maintain a "desired" or target
effective exchanse rate by making compensatory adjustments in the intervention
currency. In terns of (3), this means setting E = O, giving
- xw.r.. (4)
0 . i 1
1
This is a policy that adjusts the intervention rate to hold the nominal
effective exchange rate constant. The policy can alternatively be to stabilize
a given real rather than nominal exchange rate. In this case, the real
effective exchange rate index E is defined by
i
where Po ffi home-country price or cost index; and Pi = price or cost index
in country i. Substituting (2) into (5), adding and subtracting the cost
or price index in the nmaeraire country, Pn' and recalling once again that
_rwi = 1, the expression for E becomes[
+ - - . (6)
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The policy of stabilizing a target real effective exchange rate
requires that E _ o, so that
As (4) and (7) imply, pegging to a basket of currencies defined by a set of
weights wi is equivalent to holding constant an effective exchange rate
similarly defined by those weights (Branson and Katseli, 1982).
The Philippine monetary authorities are not known to have made adjust-
ments in the peso-dollar exchange rate on the basis of the above conside-
rations. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMP) does not report
the country as changing intervention rates according to a set of indicators,
such as differential rates of inflation, trade or current account positions,
stock of reserves, etc. Thus, it would be interesting to determine what
the adjustments in the peso_dollar exchange rate imply in terms of nominal
and real effective exchange rates, as well as what factors can explain the
rate of crawl of the intervention rate r and effective exchange rate E,0
Calculation of EER Indices
Quarterly nora/hal and real EER indices for the period 1973 to 1981 are
16
computed using bilateral trade shares as weights. The latter are based
on the average annual trade shares of industrialized countries who have at
least a one per cent share in total Philippine trade with all industrialized
countries during 1974- 1976 (Table 7). The f_rst quarter of 1973 (1973:1)
is designated as the base period because the exchange rate prevailing at
2_
Table 7
AVERAGE BILATERAL TRADE WEIGHTS_ /
(1974-1976)
Export Iaport Total Trade
Weights Welghts Weights
k
United States 42.1 34.6 38.2
Japan 37.8 41.0 39.6
Netherlauds 8.6 1.9 5.0
Germany 3.8 5.6 4.8
United Kingdom 3.4 5.6 4.5
Australla 1.7 6.0 3.9
France 1.6 2.9 2.3
Canada 1.0 2.4 1.7
TOTAL I00.0 100.0 I00.0
a/ Computed from trade data published in IMF_ Direction of Trade.
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that ti_e may be what could be considered as a "desirable" level. 17 Two
sets of real EER indices are calculated, namely: one based on the consumer
price index (CP_) and another based on the wholesale price index (WPI).
The data for exchange rates and prices are those reported in IMF's
International Fin_antis! Stat_st_ics, while the bilateral weights are
derived from IMY's Direction of Trade,
Analysis of EER Movements
From 1973:I to 1981:IV, the trade weighted effective excb_nze race
depreciated by 26.8 per cent. As Figure 2 shows_ the affecti_e depreciation
was not conttnueus j but the treud is clear. The trends of both the CPI-
based real EER and WPI-based real EER are less clear_ although both show
an effective appreciation in 1981:rV relative to the base perlod. 18 The
CPl-baeed real EEE is characterized by appreciation during 1973:1 to 1974-III_
depreciation in 1974:1V to 1978:111, appreciation £n 1978_V te 1979:1V and
relative stability in 1980:7 to 1981:IV. The WP1-based real EEE follows
roughly a similar trend except in the second (1974:IV to 1978:111) and
last (1980:I to 1981:_V) sub-periods. Over the whole period from 1973:T
Co 1981:TV, all quarterly real EER's lay below the base quarter level,
except for three quarters in 1978 when the CPT-based real EER exceeded
the EER in 1973_L In 1981:_V, the CPI-based real EEE was 13,4 per cent
below the 1973:1 rate_ while the WPl-based real EER was 23,3 per cent
below the base quarter level.
To what extent have nominal EER changes been due tO adjua_ents in
the peso-dollar inte_venClon rate to, and to what extent have they been
Figure 3
NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
130 130
120, Nominal EER 120
• • CPl-based Real EER
i00, i00
90
NPI-based Real EER
8O
; -, J L Z ) ! I P I 70
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29
due to exogenous currency realignments? The ratio of the net change in
the currencies of the Philippines' major trading partners to the change
in the intervention currency provides an idea of the relative magnitudes
involved. Over the period 1973:1 to 1981:IV, the average quarterly ratio
is 1.42, iHplying that on average, exogenous currency changes have been
42 per cent EEeater than those undertaken by the monetary authorities.
Excluding the first year of generalized currency floating, however, the
comparable ratio is 0.64, indicating that on average, exogenous currency
movements have been relatively smaller than adjustments in the intervention
rate. The relative influence on EER'8 of exogenous and policy-determined
exchange rate changes can also be seen in Figure 3.
One aspect of exchange rate flexibility that has caused concern is
that of the variability of exchange rates which may increase uncertainty
and thus, adversely affect trade and investment flows (Bautista 1979). The
risks involved can be reduced by recourse to the forward market, but as
mentioned earlier, forward c_ver is only available to transactions involving
swap arrengeaents; hence, the question of increased uncertainty remains an
important issue. In order to determine whether effective exchange rates
have exhibited more variability during the period of exchange rate flexl-
bility relative to the earlier period of fixed exchanEe rates, the variability
of monthly nominal effective exchange rates during 1973-1981 is compared to
the corresponding variability during 1964-1972. The measure of variability
employed is the standard deviation of monthly nominal exchange rates about
the mean during each period. For purposes of comparison, the _arlability
of the intervention exchange rate (ro) is also presented in Table 8 below.
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Nominal effective rates do not appear to h_ve Become more variable during
the period of generalized currency floating, The/r variability is in fact
reduced when the first two years of the float_'ng period are excluded,
Intervention rates exhibited a slm_lar pattern, their variability being
very much reduced _n 1973-1981. Intervention rates were clearly •leas
variable than effective _change rates _n the recent period_ but slightly
more varlable than the latter in 1954-19•72, These observations bring to
mind Blackls• (i_76) conclusion that "ccuntrles which ,.. _ainta_n overvalued
exchange rates and then devalue them shelly suffer high variances in their
effective exchange rates ..." _p. 35-36_,
Table 8
VARIABILITY OF INTERVENTION AND EFFECTIVE EXCHANGERATES
•_64_1972 .... ;19_3_1_8i _.. .. i]975_1981
-- - v,,
Effective Exchange Rates 16,7 12.0 10,7
Intervention Rates 17.6 5,2 3,3
. . = ......
4. 0fficial Exchan&eHarketInterVenc_on•Be_aV_r
Section 2 of this paper indicated that because of the lack of inter-
national capital market integratlon, the Phil_ppine financial system Is•not
able to provide a stable market in foreign exchange_ thus. precludinafree
f!oating as a feasible alternative, Under such circumstancesp t_e Central
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Bank must "make the market" (Branson and Katseli 1978, p. I0); the far
reaching direct and indirect controls exercised by the Philippine monetary
authorities over the foreign exchange market can be viewed in this context.
Since changes in the exchange rate can be expected to be greatly
influenced by official actions in the foreign exchange market, one way
of analyzin 8 movements in the peso-dollar exchange rate is to examine the
behavior of the monetary authorities in the exchange market. Along this
line, official exchange market intervention or reaction functions will be
estimated for the period 1973-1981, using quarterly data. The results of
the analysis should be qualified by the partial character of the approach
adopted here, as well as the inadequate treatment of the problem of
simultaneity. Inasmuch as ideally, one would model official exchange
market behavior within a complete balance of payments framework, the
effort taken in this paper should be considered as only one step towards
the specification of an exchange market or balance of payments model.
Furthermore, the estimated reaction functions should not be expected to
necessarily hold beyond the sample period or at all times during this
period.
The Central Bank has no explicit exchange intervention policy except
that of "maintaining the stability of exchange rates"; hence, alternative
hypotheses regarding how the rate of crawl is determined are tested.
Various suggestions concerning possible intervention rules (e.g., Cooper
1970; IMF Committee of Twenty 1974; Black 1976; Kenen 1980) served as the
starting point foe formulating hypotheses about the monetary authorities'
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behavior in the foreign exchange market. The alternative hypotheses
to be tested are that exchange rates are adjusted by the Central Bank on
the basis of:
I. Equation (4) above, which implies that the Central Bank acts
to stabilize the effective exchange rate.
II. A Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) rule, according to which
exchange rate adjustments are made to compensate for inflation differentials
between the domestic economy and those of major trading partners.
Ill. A reserve indicator, which calls for exchange rate changes
depending on the stock of or changes in international reserves.
IV. A balance of payments indicator, which links exchange rate
alterations to current account or basic balance developments.
Foreign exchange market intervention functions will be estimated using
the change in the exchange rate as the dependent variable and indicators
of intervention rules I to IV as explanatory variables. For the jth
intervention rules for example, the general form of the regression equation
is given by
E* = ajo + a. I. + ... + a.N!jN + u (8)jl jl J
where E* = change in the exchange rate; Ijl,...,IjN = indicators for the
jth intervention rule; ajo , ajl,...,ajN are parameters to be estimated;
and u = error or disturbance term. E* can be interpreted as the official
target change in the exchange rate which is realized in every period; and
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the l's, as determinants of the target exchange rate change (Helliwell
1979). In actual tests, E* is expressed in index form (1973:1 = I00).
Zndices of intervention and effective exchange rates are alternatively
used as the dependent variable, except in the case of intervention rule
I where only the former is used. Lagged values of indicators are included
as explanatory variablesD where appropriate.
The regression results are summarized in Table 9. Only the "best"
equations in each hypothesized set are reported in the table in order to
have a clearer focus in the analysis. The criteria for the best estimated
equation.in each set consist of the standard tests for goodness of fit,
i.e., the coefficient of multiple determination adjusted for degrees of
freedom (_2), the standard errors (or t-statistics) of the estimated
19
coefficients, and the Durbin-Watson (D.W.) statistic. The results of
other tests are mentioned in the text. An overview of the findings follows:
I. No support is provided to the hypothesis that the monetary
authorities act so as to stabilize the effective exchange rate. Except
for the coefficient of the Australian dollar, all the estimated coefficients
are not significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to note that the U.S. dollar has the highest implicit weight of 36.0 per
cent (derived from the relationship w = I - _ w. where the weights
u.s. i,
i
wi's are the estimated coefficients). In an alternative regression using
the Japanese yen as the numeraire, an implicit weight for the U.S. dollar
of 60.0 per cent was obtained. This is not surprising, since the Philippine
currency has been closely tied to the U.$. dollar.
Table 9 34
SI_4ARY OF REGRESSIONS _/
I. Effective Exchange Rate Rule
LNER - 2.76 - 0.03712 - 0.081LG + 0.078LF + 0.063LN
(3.70) (0.625) (0.504) (i.007) (0.351)
+ 0.060LK + 0.177LA + 0.148LC
(i.000) (2.199) (1.052)
_2 = 0.998 d.w. = 1.71 0 _ 0.86
NOTE: LNER - log of nominal exchange rate index; LJ, LO, IF,
LN, LK, LA, LC = log of exchange rate indices of cur-
rencies of Jaoan, Germany, 7ra_Lce, NeLh_r_gnds , United
Kingdom, Australia _nd Canada (in terms of U._. dollars),
respectively.
II. PPP Rule
A. LNER = 4.66 + 0.107LPF
(177.4) (1.255)
_2 = 0.996 d.v_ = 1.20 _ = 0._I
B. LEER - 4.69 + 0.134LPF
(91.0) (0.931)
_2 ffi0.990 d.w. = 1.82 0 = _.93
NOTE: LMER = as defined in [ above; LEER = log of effective
exchange rate index; LPF _ log of the ratio of PhIlipPlne:
CPI to weighted average of foreign CPI.
Table 9 (cont'd,)
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III, Reserve Indicators
A. Stock of Reserves (SRES)
i, I_ER = 104.7 + O.002SRES
(31,2) (1.310)
_2 = 0°922 d,_,, = O,96 0 _ 0.87
2. EER = 102.0 + 0.O07SREE
(18.5) (2.338)
_2 = 0.812 d._. = 1.71 _ = 0.89
B. Change in Reserves (CRES)
I. NER = 108.3 - 0.002CRES
(51.3) (1.393)
_2 = 0.919 d._,. = 1.21 0 = 0.90
2. EER = 51,3 - O.O03CRES
(25.2) (o.844)
_2 = 0.758 d._. _ 1.88 0 " 0.92
C. Stock of Reserves and Chan_e i_ Reserves
I. _ = _05.8 - o.o02_Es - 0.002c_s
(30.7) (0,847) (1.278)
_2 = 0.935 d._:. = 1,20 0 _ 0.89
2. EER = 102.8 + 0,006SREF - 0,002CRES
(18.0) (2,074) (0.674)
_2 = 0.803 d.w. = 1.80 p = 0.89
NOTE: N ER- nominal exchange rate index; _ER = effective
exchange rate index.
Table 9 (cont'd.)
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IV. Current Account and Basic Balance Indicators
A. Current Account Balance (CAB)
1. NER _ 104.4 - 0.O05CA_ - O.005CAB(-I) - O.O05CAB(-2)
(64.1) (2.724) (3.058) (2.837)
_2 = 0.948 d.w. _ 1.46 O _ 0.83
2. EER TM 110.9 - 0.002CAD - O.O02CAB(-I) - O.O08CAB(-2)
(19.9) (O.710) (0.823) (2.586)
._2 = 0.788 d._,. = 1.75 p ffi0.93
B. Basic Balance(BB)
i. NER = 108.3 - O.O03BB - O.O02BB(-I) - 0.O03BB(-2)
(57.6) (1.510) (1.128) (1.530)
_2 = 0.922 d.w. = 1.17 6 = 0.87
2. EER = iL3.6 + O.O01BB - O.O04BB(-I)
(22.5) (0.537) (1.622)
_2 = 0.777 d.w. = 1.80 # = 0.94
NOTE: NER = nominal exchange rate imlex; EEK_effectlve exchange
ta_e_ndea;-_CAB_-l) = CAB lagged one quarter; CAB(-2) = CAB
lagged two 0uarters; same with BB.
a/ Absolute values of t-statistic_ are in parentheses; estimation
by Cochrane-Orcutt iterative techniflue.
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2. The results, likewlse, reject the hypothesis that the monetary
authorities follow a PPP-rule. The coefficient of the relative CPI term
is not close to unity and not significantly different from zero, while
the constant is highly significant. This is true for both nominal and
effective exchange rates. Regressions using WP_ instead of CPI, and
regression equations incorporating lagged values of the explanatory
variable were also estimated, but these did not yield better results.
3. The data do not show that the stock of reserves (SEES) is an
important determinant of nominal exchange rate adjustments, although it
appears to be a significant determinant in the case of effective exchange
rates. However, the coefficient of SRES is positive in the latter case,
contrary to __considerations. The coefficient of SRES in the
regression equation for nominal exchange rates is also positive and not
significantly different from zero. Regressions using the change in
reserves (CRES) instead of SRES, as well as those using both SRES and
CRES as explanatory variables did not yield significant coefficients both
for nominal and effective exchange rates.
4. The results support the hypothesis that the Central Bank, on
average, adjusts nominal exchange rates in accordance with current account
balance (CAB) developments. The relationship is significant up to a lag
of two quarters, implying that adjustment of the intervention rate depends
on current account developments during the current period and in the recent
past. All of the coefficients are also of the expected signs. In regressions
involving: (I) only the contemporaneous CAB; and (2) the contemporaneous
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CAB and CAB lagged one quarter, all the coefficients of the explanatory
variables are not significantly different from zero. On the other hand_
the coefficients of CAB beyond a lag of two quarters are not significant.
Regressions involving the basic balance, as well as those using the
effective exchange rate as the dependent variable performed poorly. These
results confirm the point made in Section 2 above reBarding the paramount
importance of the current account in determining the exchange rate in a
financial setting such as the one in the Philippines.
5. On the whole, the regression equations for nominal exchange rates
performed much better than those for effective exchange rates, implying
that.monetary authorities make adjustments in the intervention rate on the
basis of nominal rather than effective exchange rate considerations. The
outcome of the tests involving the hypothesized intervention rule I is
consistent with this observation.
Thus, for the whole period 1973-1981, the Central Bank's reaction
function for nominal peso-dollar exchange rates can be specified in terms
of responses to exchange market pressure manifested by current account
developments in the contemporaneous as well as fairly recent periods.
However_ the rate of response implied by the estimated coefficients is
rather weak. Moreover_ because attention is focused on nominal rather
than effective exchange rates, changes in the latter have not always been
in the direction suggested by the needed adjustment. A look at Figure 4
will show that in many instances during 1973-1981, a weakening of the
current account is associated with an appreciation of the effective
39
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exchange rate and vice versa. In order to avoid such perverse develop-
ments, it would be necessary for the monetary authorities to use effective
exchange rate formulations in determining the extent and direction of
intervention. This need will become more pronounced if the trend towards
greater geographical diversification of the country's external trade
continues. Finally, in view of the more rapid rates of Philippine
inflation relative to its trading partners, an exchange policy aimed at
stabilizing a given real effective exchange rate may be advisable, in
order to ensure that the country's international competitive position is
not grossly eroded. At the minimum, the monetary authorities should be
co_istantly vigilant of changes in real effective exchange rates,
5. Conclusions
This paper has attempted to evaluate, in a rather limited sense, the
exchange experience of the Philippines during the period of generalized
currency floating. The nature of the post-1970 exchange rate regime was
analyzed, and various implications of flexibility of the country's own
as well as other countries' exchange rates were discussed. Furthermore,
changes in the peso-dollar exchange rate were examined in the light of
official intervention behavior in the foreign exchange market.
The exchange rate regime in the Philippines during the post-1970
period is characterized by limited rather than full flexlbili_y, and the
domestic currency can be more approprlate/y described as "crawling" rather
than floating vis-a-vis the U,S, dollar. In certain respects, this system
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has assisted the country in weathering the external shocks which began with
the oil crisis in 1973-1974 without the exchange upheavals that occurred in
the 1950's and 1960's. While external balance is yet to be achieved, the
system of limited exchange rate flexibility has probably prevented more
fundamental disequilibrium from developing, makingabrupt and disruptive
exchange rate adjustments less of a possibility, In the future, it would
be important for the monetary authorities to retain flexibility in exchange
rate policy, in order to ensure continuing adjustments to external imbalances.
The results of the analysis of official intervention behavior in the
Philippine foreign exchange market demonstrate the importance of the current
account in the exchange rate adjustments undertaken by the monetary autho-
rities, as well as the letter's co_itment to the nominal peso-dollar
exchange rate. The second observation can perhaps be explained by the peso's
traditional link to the U.S. dollar; however, in a world of floating exchange
rates, the country is not immune from disturbances generated by exogenous
currency realignments. Thus, it would be important for the monetary autho-
rities to consider effective exchange rate formulations in determining both
the extent and direction of intervention. Furthermore, from the viewpoint
of maintaining international competitiveness, it would be advisable, at the
very least, for the monetary authorities to be vigilant of changes in real
effective exchange rates.
This study has probably only scratched the surface, as far as research
on Philippine exchange rate policy is concerned. A logical extension would
be the formulation and estimation of an exchange rate or balance of payments
model within which it may be possible to look into the interactions _maong
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monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies and to study the effects of
external disturbances, such as those generated by exogenous currency changes,
on domestic inflation and trade flows.
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Footnotes
I. See Diaz-Alejandro (1974), Helleiner (1974), and Cline (1976) for
an elaboration on the various issues involved.
2. It was not until November 1965, however, when the peso was formally
devalued.
3. The terms of trade index (1973 - 100) declined continuously from
130.4 in 1974 to 78.1 in 1980.
4. For instance, no severe restrictions reminiscent of the 1950's and
1960!s were instituted in the 1970's. And in 1980, the government initiated
a tariff reduction program accompanied by the liberalization of the impor-
tation of previously banned categories of imports (Central Bank of the
Philippines Annual Report, 1981; p. 53). While the availability of external
financing certainly contributed to these developments, the regime of flexible
exchange rates must be considered a complimentary element. As Baldwin
(1975; p. 74) observes: "...foreign borrowings can initiate periods of
prosperity but unless ... accompanied by exchange rate policies designed
to maintain a vigorous export sector, these periods of economic activity
are doomed to end suddenly as balance of payments problems eventually build
up to a crisis."
5. _ See Central Bank of the Philippines Annual Reports for 1970, 1971
and 1972 for a more detailed explanation. In particular, see Central Bank
Circular No. 289 dated February 21, 1970 and Central Bank Circular No. 340
dated April 7, 1972.
6. Central Bank of the Philippines, "Trade and Payments System of the
Philippines," June 30, 1980 (mimeographed), p. I.
7. See Central Bank of the Philippines Annual Reports, 1971-1980.
The format of reporting is not similar for all years, e.g., in some years,
the volume of commercial bank trading in foreign exchange is reported,
while in other yearsj it is not. The trend is clear, however.
8. Foreign exchange receipts from Philippine exports and a number of
invisible transactions, e.s., foreign exchange earnings of resident owners
or operators of ocean-going vessels, U.S. dollar pension received by
Philippine residents, and foreign exchange acquisition of resident insurance
companies, are required to be surrendered to the Central Bank or its agent
banks, and thus, not eligible for deposit. See Central Bank of the
Philippines Circular No. 343 dated April 24, 1972.
44
9. Williamson (1965; p. 2) defines the "crawling peg" as a "system
under which such par changes as occur are implemented slowly, in such a
large number of small steps as to make the process of exchange rate adjust-
ment continuous for all practical purposes: a system, therefore, under
which the peg crawls from one level to another."
I0. The average increase in the Philippine CP! durin 8 1973-1981 was
14.2 per cent per year, as compared to a trade weighted average increase
of 9.5 per cent per year in the CPI's of the U.S., Japan. Canada, France,
Oe1_any, Australia, the U.K. and Netherlands during the same period.
ii. See DonEes (1972) for a discussion of the brazilian experience.
12. For a more detailed account of the control system, see Baldwin(1975).
13. The decontrol program was primarily directed at dismantling the
very stringent and complicated controls introduced in the late 1950's.
Baldwin (1975; p. 58) notes: "...exchange controls were removed, but
liberalization in the sense of a significant easing of all controls over
imports did not occur." Furthermore, restrictions remained on domestic
citizens' dealings in foreign exchange and foreign securities. These
explain the existence of differentials even during the decontrol period.
14. The standard deviation of monthly black market exchange rates
about the mean during 1964-1972 is 18.5, as compared to 6.1 during 1973-
1979.
15. This definition differs from Chat adopted in the NBER set of
studies (Krueger, 1975)on the effects of liberalizatlon in a number of
LDC's. The "effective exchange rate" in the NBER studies is defined as
the number of domestic currency units actually paid or received per unit
of foreign currency, and is computed by adjusting the official parity
(for a specific transaction or sector) for surcharges , tariffs, implicit
interests foregone or guarantee deposits, and other charges on imports
and subsidies on exports.
16. These are the appropriate weights to use in the _,-Ii country
case when the objective of policy is the stabilization of the domestic
relative price of tradable goods (Black, 1976; Branson and Katseli, 1978).
Other objectives which have been suggested are the minimization of
fluctuations in the terms of trade and the current account (Branson and
Katseli, 1980), the stabilization of the variance of the real effective
exchange rate (Lipschitz and Sundararajan, 1980), and the stabilization
of domestic real income (Turnovsky, 1980). Black suggests that the
stabilization of the domestic relative price of tradable goods may be the
appropriate objective for a small open LDC economy: "... less developed
countries typically have little influence over their terms of tzade_ so
that the main channel through which exchange rates affect the economy is
the ratio of traded goods prices to non-traded goods prices" (p. 37).
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The Philippines accounts for a major portion of world trade in
coconut oil. However, a large share in trade in specific commodities does
not necessarily imply export market power in view of substitution possibi-
lities, among other things. In the case of coconut oil, the presence of
closely competing substitutes, such as palm, soybean and cottonseed oils,
and synthetic products, has prevented the Philippines from exercising any
significant market power. Thus, the small country assumption holds for
the Philippines.
17. This is not meant to say, however, that'the exchange rate pre-
vailing in 1973:1 is necessarily the "equilibrium exchange rate." Krueger
(1975) points out that while an equilibrium exchange rate can be precisely
defined in theory, it is elusive in empirical work; hence, she defines the
equilibrium rate as one not requiring quantitative restrictions or foreign
borrowings to bolster or prevent reserve depletion. This is not "conceptually
satisfactory.., however, it suffices for empirical analyiis inmost instances"
(pp. 62-63). Following this definition, a period characterized by a surplus
in the balance of payments may be more suitable as a base than one registering
zero balance or deficits in view of the existence of various exchange and
trade restrictions. The implied assumption is that if these restrictions
were removed, the external accounts would tend to balance, and reserves
would remain unchanged at the same exchange rate. During 1973:1, a BOP
surplus of U.S.$191 million wag posted; foreign borrowings were "relatively
modest (U.S.$17 million). Except for 1973:11, BOP performance in the ,
following q,arterly periods were not as strong as that in 1973:1; foreign
borrowings also increased substantially after 1973:11.
18. The wholesale price index is usually employed in e_pirical work
involving the real exchange rate because it includes the prices of a great
number of internationally traded goods. Following this reasoning, the ratio
of foreign to domestic wholesale prices can be considered as a proxy for
the relative price of traded goods. An alternative is to use a proxy for
the relative price of traded to non-traded goods, using a weighted average
of import and export prices for the former and the net value added deflator
or an index of domestically produced-goods' prices for the latter.
19. In most instances, the final choice depended on the level of
significance of the est_m, ted coefficients.
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